Following Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) consolidation of its dominance over other factions in northern Syria, we can now speak of a governing strategy pursued by the transitional government that may be described as “piecemeal takeover.” This method is based not on achieving a sudden and direct victory over opponents, but on defeating them gradually.
This approach relies on long-term strategic patience. It is based on gradually dismantling the structures of opponents without resorting to full military confrontation or decisive clashes, while waiting for the right moment, whether internally or externally, to weaken or contain the opposing side, making it easier to impose conditions and consolidate complete control.
This strategy follows a clear sequence: it begins by stripping the opponent of legitimacy, then exploits its mistakes, distorts its image through organized media and public campaigns, and finally moves against it once the political ground has been prepared.
Through this tactic, HTS was able to impose its political and military control over northern Syria in Idlib years before the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation. When the time came to move toward Damascus, it was able, thanks to its organizational strength, to unify factions under its banner in the “liberation” battle, while promising participating forces limited positions within the authority structure, thereby reinforcing its political dominance without relinquishing its absolute effective power.
Today, after HTS reached power and took control of most sovereign ministries and key state institutions, this approach is no longer merely a temporary tactic. It has become a comprehensive strategy for governing and dealing with opponents, transcending national, religious, and ideological differences.
On the other hand, this method has led to major crises at critical moments. The massacres on the coast and in Suwayda are examples of this. Moreover, this policy has also failed to provide the legitimacy and stability sought by the transitional government. The approach of “gradually containing the other while granting it crumbs of power” creates permanent tensions and renders political pluralism largely superficial, as demonstrated in the appointment of a few women or ministers from different sects. Meanwhile, the relationship with the Syrian Democratic Forces represents the clearest example of the nature of the existing power-sharing arrangement. In this relationship, what took precedence was not the rights of the Kurdish people, but the interests of the apparatuses.
On the other hand, this equation cannot be understood without considering the crisis of the Syrian left opposition. Confronting the current authority requires, first, a scientific analysis of the structure of power, its methods of operation, and its points of weakness. Second, it requires the formulation of a clear political program linking overall strategy with daily tactics, while maintaining sufficient flexibility to adjust these tactics according to changing realities.
The most significant weaknesses of the left opposition lie in the absence of a comprehensive program capable of unifying economic, social, and democratic demands within an integrated vision. Added to this are organizational fragmentation and the refusal of certain non-governmental organization activists to build political coordination that transcends identities and narrow divisions, thereby reinforcing individualism and scattered initiatives.
Likewise, attempts by remnants of the former regime to exploit legitimate demands cannot be ignored, as happened during the April 17 protests against the rising cost of living. Ex-regime loyalists presented these spontaneous protests on social media as if they were their own initiative. The transitional government skillfully used this to criminalize the entire movement. Without directly resorting to the apparatuses of repression, it paved the way for attacks on the protesters by claiming that they were linked to the former regime.
For this reason, protecting the opposition organizationally and politically becomes a fundamental necessity in order to preserve the legitimacy of social and economic demands and guarantee its independence from any existing bourgeois authority.
In reality, what we are facing today is a transitional government lacking solid social legitimacy. A year and a half after coming to power, the government has failed to provide serious or lasting solutions to the fundamental demands raised by the revolution, foremost among them the severe social and economic suffering experienced by workers and the poor.
For example, after the government took control of the resource-rich Jazira region (north eastern Syria), this did not translate into any improvement in the living conditions of the masses. On the contrary, conditions worsened further with rising fuel prices and electricity bills, making popular criticism of the authorities more visible and widespread.
This was evident in the protests staged by hundreds of farmers in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Daraa following the government’s announcement of the wheat procurement price. Farmers viewed the price as unfair and inadequate in light of soaring production costs, arguing that it failed to meet their expectations or address their demands for improved living conditions and greater support for the agricultural sector.
One of the most notable labor mobilizations in recent weeks was the strike carried out by hundreds of workers at Zenobia Company, an industrial facility in the southern Damascus countryside. The workers demanded higher wages, better working conditions, and a safer work environment. This strike reflects the extent of the deterioration in working-class living conditions amid the widening gap between wages and the cost of living. It also points to a growing willingness among workers to organize and protest around the immediate economic and social demands that directly affect their daily lives.
At its core, government promises of development through foreign investment and privatization are nothing more than empty illusions. Urgent problems such as deep poverty, unemployment, the housing crisis, and low wages can only be addressed through genuine and radical measures beginning with the nationalization of Assad oligarchy wealth, the rejection of the debts of the former regime, and directing the country’s resources toward meeting the needs of the working classes and popular sectors.
As for transitional justice and the rights of different national and religious communities, government policy is based primarily on delay and attempts to fragment or contain the opposition. The same applies to questions of national sovereignty, confronting occupations, and opposing the Zionist project.
From this perspective, there is a need for a political plan that raises the urgent economic and democratic demands of workers and oppressed sectors and seeks to mobilize the masses around them. On this basis, we call on all vanguards and activists who remain committed to the revolution’s slogans of freedom and dignity to unite around a common program of struggle.
We understand that this road is neither the easiest nor the shortest. However, we believe that building a genuine and serious alternative for the working classes, independent of bourgeois and imperialist forces, can only be achieved through this path.
